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Science and the law primers 
Foreword 
The judicial primers project is a unique collaboration between members of the judiciary, 
the Royal Society and the Royal Society of Edinburgh. The primers have been created 
under the direction of a Steering Group initially chaired by Lord Hughes of Ombersley 
who was succeeded by Lady Justice Rafferty DBE, and are designed to assist the 
judiciary when handling scientific evidence in the courtroom. They have been written 
by leading scientists and members of the judiciary, peer reviewed by practitioners and 
approved by the Councils of the Royal Society and the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 
Each primer presents an easily understood, accurate position on the scientific topic in 
question, and considers the limitations of the science and the challenges associated 
with its application. The way scientific evidence is used can vary between jurisdictions, 
but the underpinning science and methodologies remain consistent. For this reason 
we trust these primers will prove helpful in many jurisdictions throughout the world 
and assist the judiciary in their understanding of scientific topics. The primers are not 
intended to replace expert scientific evidence; they are intended to help understand 
it and assess it, by providing a basic, and so far as possible uncontroversial, statement 
of the underlying science. 
The production of this primer on the use of statistics in legal proceedings has been 
led by Professor Niamh Nic Daéid FRSE. We are most grateful to her, to the Executive 
Director of the Royal Society, Dr Julie Maxton CBE, the Chief Executive of the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, Dr Rebekah Widdowfield, and the members of the Primers 
Steering Group, the Editorial Board and the Writing Group. Please see the back page  
for a full list of acknowledgements. 
        
Dame Anne Glover 
President of the Royal Society of Edinburgh
Sir Venki Ramakrishnan  
President of the Royal Society
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Summary, introduction and scope
The aim of this primer is to provide assistance to the judiciary and legal professionals 
in understanding the principles of evaluating evidence (that has a statistical basis) 
presented in the courts. The primer is presented in two parts. The first part provides 
a general introduction to the use of statistical and probabilistic tools within legal 
processes with some examples presented, including some relating to evidence types 
commonly presented to the courts.
The second part consists of five appendices. 
Appendices 1 – 3 provide specific information about how statistical and probabilistic 
tools may be used in assisting the delivery of evaluative opinions by forensic 
practitioners relating to common types of scientific evidence encountered primarily 
in criminal cases, for example trace evidence (eg fibres, glass, DNA) and impression 
evidence (eg footwear marks, toolmarks, fingerprints). 
Appendices 4 and 5 relate to specific statistical methods and to their use in assessing 
statistical significance and relative risk. These areas generally have more relevance in 
civil proceedings. 
This short guide cannot equip the judiciary and legal professionals with all the 
necessary skills required, but it should be useful for signposting where problems  
may arise and where external expertise may be needed.
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1. What is statistical science?
Reasoning about data is increasingly recognised as an essential skill for modern life. 
Fact-finding and the assessment of expert evidence in court cases often requires an 
understanding of probability, statistics and numbers. Various different statistical and 
probabilistic tools can be used to address different questions relating to the context 
of individual cases presented to the courts and the choice of which tools to use will 
depend on the questions that need to be addressed. Standard types of questions  
which can be answered by statistical science may be categorised as follows: 
• Descriptive statistics: eg What is the number of rapes reported in the country?  
How many drugs of a particular type are found in drug seizures?
• Inference from observed data to a larger population: eg Given the responses  
to the British Crime Survey, what is the estimated number of illegal drug users  
in the UK?
• Inference from observed data to a scientific conclusion: eg Did the exposure to  
the emissions from an incinerator raise the risk of birth defects1?
• Prediction: eg Given a set of characteristics, what is the chance that the accused  
will reoffend2? 
• Evaluation: The evaluation of scientific findings in court uses probability as a measure 
of uncertainty. This is based upon the findings, associated data, expert knowledge, 
case-specific propositions and conditioning information3. 
All these situations are characterised by uncertainty, and probability theory provides  
the tools and language for handling and communicating uncertainty. 
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Statistical science has developed a wide range of powerful techniques for quantifying 
the impact of some sources of uncertainty, eg calculating margins of error from a survey, 
measuring the support for a proposition (also called a hypothesis) from observed data 
or assessing the probability of a future event. Other sources of uncertainty are not 
so easily quantified but can still be informally assessed and communicated, eg those 
arising from the reliability of survey respondents, the quality of scientific studies and  
the relevance of available and good quality datasets to the facts of a legal case. 
Unavoidable uncertainty about the future is often termed chance, also known as 
aleatory uncertainty, and the assignment of probabilities to future events is familiar. 
Legal cases generally deal with uncertainty in the sense of lack of knowledge, also 
known as epistemic uncertainty. Fortunately, the theory of probability can still be applied 
in this context. Uncertainty of measurement can also arise and this, in general, can be 
characterised for objective measurements (eg how much of a controlled substance may 
be in an analysed sample) but is more challenging for more subjective measurements 
(eg in the examination of toolmarks).
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1.1 Use of statistical science and types of evidence 
Statistical science can be called upon to support expert knowledge when dealing  
with a variety of types of evidence and proceedings. These include:
• evaluation of DNA evidence4;
• evaluation of trace evidence, eg fibres, glass, paint or firearms discharge residues 
(Appendix 2);
• evaluation of pattern-matching evidence, eg toolmarks, ballistics and fingerprint 
evidence (Appendix 3); and
• causation of illness or injury in a civil case, where it may be helpful to apply 
epidemiological research (the study of occurrence, aetiology, prognosis and 
treatment of illness in populations) to individual cases (Appendix 5).
The way in which statistical science may be used in a legal context is illustrated in 
Figure 1.
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The process by which statistical science may be used in legal proceedings and in  
which relevant past data are used to draw conclusions about the facts of a current case.
FIGURE 1
1. Identification of an observation related to a specific item of evidence relevant  
to some aspect of the current case.
2. Providing a list of appropriate potential propositions concerning the  
evidence, which may include prosecution allegations and any defence 
alternative assertions.
3. Identifying resources containing relevant past data or creating new  
relevant datasets.
4. Methods for using the accumulated information in a database (if available) to 
derive a numerical or verbal expression of the probative value of the observation 
related to the item of evidence with regard to the competing propositions.
5. Communication of probative value of evidence.
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1.2 Communication of the probative value when statistical science is used 
When conclusions based on statistical science are drawn from data, it is crucial that  
the data and the reasoning supporting those conclusions are transparent. Under the 
term ‘intelligent transparency’ Baroness Onora O’Neill5 has argued that the data  
and reasoning must be:
• accessible: ie easily available and not, for example, hidden behind  
a proprietary algorithm;
• understandable: to everyone involved in the case, including a jury;
• useable: they address current specific concerns; and
• assessable: where the ‘working’ is open to scrutiny by legal and other professionals.
There is always uncertainty involved in statistics, particularly in assessing the  
relevance of available historical data to a current case. There may also be some  
extent of disagreement between different professionals, but this may not be of real 
substance. Statistical conclusions are only as reliable as the model (and data) from  
which they are derived.
Estimates are neither wholly right nor wholly wrong, conclusions are not mechanistic 
and sometimes the only database available is the experience of the professional. In 
such situations transparency is particularly necessary and the experience needs to be 
documented with emphasis on the relevance to the case in question. The professional 
judgement of the appropriate experts (expert knowledge) is inevitably involved in each 
stage of the process outlined in Figure 1. Probability is a conceptual device that helps 
us think and reason logically when faced with uncertainty about the occurrence of a 
questioned event in the past, present or the future. 
Probability helps us think clearly and coherently about uncertain events. 
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By way of an example to explain probability, we can use the idea of ‘expected 
frequency’ (such a frequentist approach is not appropriate in forensic inference  
where probability is conditional and personal but is used here to explain the notion  
of probability). When faced with a question concerning likely outcomes if a coin is 
flipped twice, you ask yourself: What would I expect to happen if I tried the experiment 
many times? Take the example that you repeated this double-flip experiment 100  
times. As shown in Figure 2, in 25 out of these 100 repeats you would expect to get  
two heads. Therefore, the reasoning goes, the probability that on a particular attempt  
you would get two heads is 1 in 4, or ¼. Which, fortunately, is the correct answer.  
This probability can be equivalently expressed as a fraction (¼), a decimal (0.25),  
a percentage (25%), a proportion (1 out of 4) or betting odds (3 to 1 against). 
 
Expected frequency tree when repeating a double-flip of a coin 100 times. We would 
expect the first flip to be heads in 50 of these experiments, and both flips to be heads  
in 25. 
FIGURE 2
 100
 25
 25
 25
 25
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Tails
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Tails
Heads
Tails
First
Second
 50
 50
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Probability follows basic rules in which:
• probabilities of all possible events add to 1 (eg in Figure 2 there are four possible 
events, so their probabilities add to 1); the probability of not getting two heads is  
¾ or 75%; 
• probabilities are multiplied for sequences of events which are independent  
(eg the probability of two heads in a row is ½ × ½ = ¼); and
• probabilities are added when considering probabilities of separate  
(mutually exclusive) sets of events (eg the probability of getting two  
heads or two tails is ¼ + ¼ = ½). 
It is a common misapprehension that probabilities can only be used for future events 
with some randomness. While it is true that an event has either happened or not, 
many statisticians will feel that it is reasonable to assign probabilities to our personal 
uncertainty about unknown facts, as the following example shows.
Suppose I have a coin and I ask you for your probability that it will come up heads.  
You answer “50:50”, or similar (50% or ½). Then I flip it, cover up the result before either 
of us sees it and again ask for your probability that it is heads. You may, after a pause, 
say “50:50”. Then I take a quick look at the coin, without showing you, and repeat the 
question. Again, if you are like most people, you eventually say “50:50”. This simple 
exercise reveals a major distinction between two types of uncertainty: what is known 
as aleatory uncertainty before I flip the coin – the ‘chance’ of an unpredictable event – 
and epistemic uncertainty after I flip the coin – an expression of our personal ignorance 
about an event that is fixed but unknown. In forensic science we are almost always 
concerned with epistemic uncertainty about the facts of a past situation. 
Probabilities are commonly used to express epistemic uncertainty in legal settings. 
Section 2 provides more detail on the meaning of probability in such contexts, including 
Bayes’ theorem and the role of the likelihood ratio (LR).
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2.  Probability and the principles of 
evaluating scientific evidence
Specifically, in a legal context, probability can help fact-finders assess the impact of 
evidence on the truth or otherwise of a particular proposition. It has a well-documented 
history in academic legal literature6. Each item of evidence can be used to support one 
or more proposition(s). Evidence may, on occasion, point directly to incriminating or 
exculpating a suspect of a particular crime, but will more likely have probative value in 
discriminating between competing propositions for either the source of some material 
found in relation to a scene of the crime or an alleged activity connected to a crime. 
For example, competing source-level propositions concerning a fragment of glass found 
on a suspect’s clothing might include that the glass fragments came, or did not come, 
from a particular broken window. Competing activity-level propositions might be that the 
suspect broke or did not break the particular glass in question at a particular time. 
2.1 What probability is not
Probability is not an inherent property of material or objects. For example, a pack of 
playing cards does not possess a specific probability for an ace being drawn from it. 
But you may say, given your current state of knowledge about the properties of the 
pack, “that the probability of drawing an ace from a pack of playing cards is 4 in 52, or 
1 in 13”. Such a probability is based on certain assumptions. It is assumed that, among 
other considerations, (i) it is a full pack of 52 cards; (ii) it is well shuffled; (iii) the cards are 
exactly the same shape, size and condition so as not to influence the physical act of a 
draw; and (iv) the person drawing the card will do so without any bias. The probability 
figure of 1/13 (or roughly 8%) is your own best assessment, based on your knowledge of 
the composition of a full pack of cards and based on the implicit assumptions outlined. 
It is a probability with which most of us would agree and it is one that would work 
well in gambling games, but it is not an inherent property of the aces in the pack or 
of any of the other cards in the pack. The implication here is that even in cases with 
well-structured chance devices, such as a deck of cards, if you have already been 
dealt a couple of aces, your probability for the next card being an ace has dropped 
considerably. Probability is personal: it is personal in the sense that it depends on the 
knowledge available to the person making the judgement and on the assumptions 
they make. 
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But that is not to say that personal probability is conjured up on a whim or a preference, 
or to suggest it is not based on acquired data. Where relevant data are available, it is 
expected that they will be taken into account in assigning a probability. For example, 
suppose that reliable information is available on the proportion of individuals in a target 
population that possess a particular observable feature, such as skin, hair or eye colour. 
Then, our assessment that a person drawn randomly from that population will show a 
particular feature of interest ought to be informed by the available knowledge about the 
composition of the population. When new testing systems are used, the frequencies of 
given traits in a population will not be widely known. 
2.2 Personal probabilities 
We make personal assignments of probability every day:
• What is the probability that I will miss the bus this morning if I have one more  
cup of coffee?
• What is the probability that I will be caught if I break into this property?
In such circumstances, the probabilities that we assign, albeit not mathematically 
evaluated or even verbalised in this way, will depend on our knowledge and 
understanding of the factors and risks involved. Such probabilities are also known  
as personal ‘degrees of belief’. 
Some people may attempt to answer the above questions by thinking of past 
experiences in similar situations. For example, they may consider how many mornings 
in the past they have missed the bus when having one more cup of coffee, though this 
may give rise to many other questions, such as the extent to which today’s morning is 
comparable to previous experiences. 
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Statisticians and scientists refer to data on the proportion of times an event has occurred 
as a relative frequency. However, and most importantly, there are some situations 
for which relative frequencies cannot be meaningfully conceived. In legal cases, for 
example, the fact-finder must deal with singular, non-repeatable, one-off events for 
which the notion of relative frequency may not be helpful. This does not preclude 
the possibility that useful frequency data may be available (eg scientific data on the 
occurrence of genetic features or the prevalence of a disease) to help decide aspects 
of the case (examples of this type of use are in Appendices 4 and 5). Where such data 
are available and are relevant, they ought to be used in probability assignment as one 
source of information among others.
Experts assign personal probabilities based on their experience, knowledge and 
understanding of their type of expert evidence. However, a challenge with such 
probabilities is the potential influence of cognitive effects. The reliability of expert-
assigned probabilities is determined by various factors, including: 
• the extent and relevance of the expert’s experience; 
• the ability of the expert to compile and store systematically those experiences  
in their memory; 
• the expert’s ability to recall accurately the relevant data; 
• the expert’s ability to avoid and mitigate against bias while inputting expert 
knowledge; and
• calibration, ie measuring the extent to which those events assigned a probability 
of (say) 40% actually do have a relative frequency of occurrence close to 40%. 
In general, the more that experts base their assignments of probability on relevant, 
shared and robust data, the greater is the trustworthiness of those assignments. The 
more they base their assignments on their recalled experience and knowledge and 
on their intuition, the more those assignments will be open to justified challenge.
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2.3 Datasets containing relevant past observations
Evaluation of evidence using likelihood ratios (LRs) often involves the use of datasets 
and statistical assumptions. It is important that these datasets, assumptions and 
calculations are clearly stated and appropriate for the problem. Validation tests should 
be carried out to gauge the statistical assumptions and to ensure that the LR values 
presented in court are reliable. Datasets should be from relevant populations and 
should not bias the results of the analysis.
The Court of Appeal decided in Regina v Abadom7 that an expert is entitled to draw 
upon material produced by others in the field in which his or her expertise lies, and 
indeed where any reliable data are available that bear upon the question the expert 
is addressing. It is part of the duty of the expert to take this into account. So, a crucial 
judgement concerns the reliability and relevance of available data. The dataset 
should have high intrinsic quality, reliability and high relevance to the question being 
addressed by the use of the data. A national dataset of informally collected examples 
of glass or footwear from people’s homes may be of limited relevance to local criminal 
investigations but of value in informing background abundance of the items in question, 
while local datasets collected to address specific aspects of criminal incidents or of 
suspect populations may have high relevance. Ideally, there will be an appropriately 
large enough random sample from a population that matches agreed features of the 
case, but this is a high bar that is rarely achieved and means that expert judgement and 
full transparency are required to deal with such limitations.
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2.4 Probative value expressed as a likelihood ratio 
Technically, the LR is the probability of the evidence assuming that proposition A is true 
divided by the probability of the evidence assuming tha proposition B is true:
LR =
probability of the evidence, if A is true
probability of the evidence, if B is true
LRs are typically attached to DNA evidence in which a ‘match’ of some degree is found 
between the suspect’s DNA profile and the DNA profile derived from a trace found at 
the scene of a crime. The two competing hypotheses are that the DNA profile in the 
recovered trace material originates from the suspect or it originates from someone else, 
so that we can express the LR as:  
LR =
probability of the DNA profile ‘match’, if the suspect left the trace
probability of the DNA profile ‘match’, if the trace was left by  
someone else
The ‘DNA evidence’ is the suspect’s DNA together with the DNA trace from the crime 
scene. For the specific situation when the trace contains plenty of DNA and it is deemed 
to have come from one person, the LR above can be written, after some mathematical 
operations and given some assumptions, as:
LR =
1
random match probability
The random match probability is the probability of finding an evidence match if selecting 
at random from within a particular population. For example, in the context of a DNA 
sample8, it is the probability of observing a DNA profile of an unknown person that is the 
same as the DNA profile from a crime scene stain (and assuming a particular population 
genetic model). Typical LRs for DNA evidence are in the millions or billions, although 
the exact values may be contested, such as when there are complications due to the 
traces containing a mix of DNA from multiple people. Further information is provided in 
Forensic DNA analysis: a primer for the courts9. 
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Table 1 shows an example of a verbal scale used for communicating LRs (a similar 
example can be found in Willis10). In most cases (including DNA at an activity level where 
the activity that caused the DNA to be deposited is the issue) the LR will be based on 
a semi-quantitative (ie an order of magnitude) assessment and a verbal equivalent may 
be presented to the court. The reason that verbal expressions are defined numerically 
is to provide a consistency in their use rather than to translate available numbers into a 
common language. In those cases where a quantitative assignment is possible there is 
a strong argument for presenting the LR value to the court without a verbal qualifier but 
also an argument for avoiding the risk that lay persons (eg juries) may misunderstand 
conclusions stated in numbers as absolute measurements. An LR equal to 1 supports 
neither proposition preferentially.
The LR is not a specific measurement, but rather is the weight of evidence of the 
scientific findings in two competing scenarios (prosecution and defence). There will 
almost always be some natural variation in LRs depending on different assumptions 
and the quality and relevance of the datasets and what is known about the transfer, 
persistence, recovery and background abundance of the particular type of evidence 
under scrutiny. The value of the LR on the scale shown in Table 1 is preferably assigned 
based on robust data extracted from a relevant dataset. 
With good quality and relevant data it may be possible to generate a numerical 
assessment using the LR relating to evidential support. However, often the available 
data are either poor or non-existent (particularly true for knowledge relating to the 
transfer of material and its persistence once transferred). In such cases, the expert 
forms a personal opinion based on domain knowledge of processes and on personal 
experience that can be disclosed and audited. In these situations, verbal expressions 
or orders of magnitude of the LR may be helpful and the basis of any statement of 
expert opinion formed this way must always be made clear. 
 
THE USE OF STATISTICS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 19
Example of verbal interpretations of likelihood ratios (LRs) – in this case for source-  
level propositions.
TABLE 1 
Value of LR Verbal equivalent Supported proposition
<0.000001 Extremely strong support
Different source
0.0001-0.000001 Very strong support
0.001 – 0.0001 Strong support
0.01 – 0.001 Moderately strong support
0.1 – 0.01 Moderate support
<1 – 0.1 Limited (or weak) support
About 1 Neutral Neither proposition is supported  
in preference to the other
>1 – 10 Limited (weak) support
Same source
10 – 100 Moderate support
100 – 1,000 Moderately strong support
1,000 – 10,000 Strong support
10,000 – 1,000,000 Very strong support
>1,000,000 Extremely strong support
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2.5 Bayes’ theorem and the likelihood ratio 
Bayes’ theorem provides a general rule for updating probabilities about a proposition in 
the light of new evidence. It says that:
the posterior (final) odds for a proposition  =
the LR x the prior  
(initial) odds for the proposition 
For example, suppose a hypothetical screening test for doping in sports is claimed to  
be ‘95% accurate’, meaning that if an athlete is doping there is a 95% chance (probability 
0.95; sensitivity) of obtaining a positive test result, and if the athlete is a non-doper 
there is a 95% chance (probability 0.95; specificity) of obtaining a negative test result. 
Such general performance characteristics have been determined through tests under 
controlled conditions, ie by applying the test in so-called ground truth cases, where it is 
known whether a tested person is doping or not. 
Assuming that the odds of an athlete taking drugs prior to being subject to a screening 
test are 1 in 50 (1:50), then if an athlete tests positive what is the probability that they are 
truly doping? 
The LR (explained in Section 2.4) is the probability of a positive test given the 
proposition that the athlete is doping (95%) divided by the probability of a positive test 
given the proposition that the athlete is not doping (5%, ie 1 - specificity). This ratio is 19 
(LR = 0.95/0.05 = 19).
Bayes’ theorem tells us that the posterior odds of the athlete having taken drugs can be 
computed by multiplying the prior odds of that proposition by the LR provided by the 
positive test. In this form, we have to work with odds not probability. Odds are related 
mathematically to probability and a very simple conversion can be used to give the 
value for probability where the odds of m:n correspond to the probability m/(m + n). 
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So, for the doping example, 
• the prior odds for the proposition ‘athlete is doping’ versus ‘athlete is not doping’ 
are 1:50, which correspond to a probability of 1/(1 + 50) or a prior probability of 
approximately 0.02 (the actual value is 0.0196, which is equivalent to 1.96%);
• the LR is 0.95/0.05 = 19; and
• therefore, by Bayes’ theorem, the posterior odds that the athlete is doping are (1:50) 
x 19 = 19:50, giving a posterior probability of doping of 19/(19 + 50) ≈ 0.28 or 28%.
So, even though drug testing could be claimed to be ‘95% accurate’ (based on the 
sensitivity and specificity metric) this does not mean that, in the event of a positive result, 
there is a 95% chance that the athlete is doping. In this example, the probability that the 
athlete is doping, given a positive test result, is approximately 28%. The posterior odds 
that an athlete is doping crucially depend on the prior odds for the proposition ‘athlete is 
doping’ versus ‘athlete is not doping’ (in the example this was 1:50) prior to considering 
the result of the screening test (the LR result). This means that if conclusions are drawn 
from test results in isolation there could be misinterpretations of what is meant by the 
accuracy of the test. This could cause conclusions such as athletes being incorrectly 
accused of doping because they failed a drug test. 
In practice, the Court of Appeal has ruled that Bayes’ theorem should not be used by 
a jury to combine and weigh evidence11, but LRs assessed by experts are permitted if 
they have a sound basis. Many real-world cases involve multiple and related items of 
evidence, making probabilistic inference much more complex and intricate than the 
illustrative doping example given above.
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3.  Issues with the potential for 
misunderstanding
3.1 Prosecutor’s fallacy  
The prosecutor's fallacy occurs when the probability of the evidence (matching DNA 
profile, glass fragment of the same refractive index as the fragment recovered from 
the target window, etc) given innocence (the random match probability) is incorrectly 
interpreted as the probability of innocence given the evidence. This is formally known 
as ‘transposing the conditional’, and is a clear breach of logic that becomes obvious 
when the correct statement ‘If it’s a dog, the chances are very high that it has four legs’ 
is transposed to ‘If an animal has four legs, the chances are very high that it’s a dog’.
3.2 Defence attorney’s fallacy  
The defence attorney’s fallacy occurs when it is reported how many people with 
the matching characteristics are likely to be found in a defined population (eg the 
population of the UK). This assumes that the perpetrator is part of some arbitrarily 
large population and that there is no other information available, so that everyone is 
equally likely to be the perpetrator. Under these assumptions, it is deduced that there 
is a small probability that the suspect is the perpetrator. It is a fallacy to infer from this 
that the evidence is weak.
3.3 Combining evidence  
A standard statistical approach is to include all evidence in a single calculation, each 
item weighted by its relative strength expressed by LRs. This technique is used, for 
example, in email spam filters and in Case study 1.
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Likelihood ratios (LRs) assessed for items of evidence found on a skeleton  
recovered in Leicester.
TABLE 2
Evidence LR  
(conservative 
assignment) 
Verbal equivalent
Radiocarbon dating CE 1456 – 1530 1.8 Weak support
Age and sex of skeleton 5.3 Weak support
Scoliosis 212 Moderately strong support
Post-mortem wounds 42 Moderate support
Mitochondrial DNA match 478 Moderately strong support
Y chromosome not matching 0.16 Weak evidence against
Combined evidence 6.5 million Extremely strong support  
CASE STUDY 1
An archaeological case
On Saturday 25 August 2012, archaeologists began an excavation for Richard III’s 
remains by digging in a car park in Leicester. Within a few hours they found their first 
skeleton and the question was whether this was Richard III. Table 2 shows the specific 
items of evidence and their likelihood ratios (LRs) regarding the propositions that the 
skeleton was that of Richard III. These LRs were, as far as possible, based on sound 
statistical evidence, but there was inevitably some uncertainty so that conservative 
values were assigned, and verbally interpreted here (because of their uncertainty 
and therefore qualitative nature) using the terms in Table 1.
Probability theory permits, given certain assumptions about the evidence, the 
multiplication of these LRs to give a final number that represents ‘extremely strong’ 
evidence to support the proposition that the skeleton was, rather than was not, that of 
Richard III. Of course, the final assignation of the skeleton would not be based on the 
LR alone but would involve other evidence as well.
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Such an approach is used when combining multiple aspects of a forensic scientist’s 
findings, eg when combining individual peaks within a DNA profile. Some contrast 
this with the way in which the law approaches fact-finding in civil cases: ‛If a legal rule 
requires a fact to be proved (a “fact in issue”), a judge or jury must decide whether or 
not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law 
operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened 
or it did not12.’
In statistical science, however, the uncertainty regarding facts is carried through any 
chain of reasoning and influences trust in the final conclusions. The expert can properly 
ask what the level of probability or uncertainty is. However, courts are perfectly used to 
bringing into the calculation of a primary conclusion uncertain disputed facts along the 
way and without necessarily resolving each uncertainty. Sometimes evidence going to 
disputed contributory facts, when combined with other evidence going to a different 
disputed contributory fact, may enable a conclusion to be reached safely on the 
principal fact in issue. Likewise, juries are commonly directed that they do not need to 
resolve every dispute in the evidence, so long as they are satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt of the guilt of the accused. Some disputed facts can safely be left unresolved and 
scientific findings will generally have a degree of uncertainty rather than a definite value.
3.4 Coincidences and rare events 
Intuition is notoriously poor at assessing how ‘surprising’ an event is. Just because 
an event is exceedingly rare for a particular person (eg winning the lottery at odds 
of 45 million to 1 against) does not necessarily mean it is a surprising event to occur 
to someone (because of the large number of tickets sold). When three major plane 
crashes occurred within an eight-day period in 2014, it appeared to many to be beyond 
coincidence. But there is around a 60% probability that such a ‘cluster’ will happen at 
some point over a ten-year period. 
 
3.5 Interpretation of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and ‘balance of probabilities’  
These might appear to be expressions of probability for either criminal guilt or on 
behalf of one of the sides in a civil case, respectively. In fact, they relate to the strength 
of the evidence required by the legal system, the prior odds provided for, or against, 
a particular explanation of events and the relative merits and losses associated with 
accurate and erroneous consequences of a decision. 
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4.  The role of expert witnesses and what 
should be expected from them 
The guidelines for expert witnesses in England and Wales13 provide a useful reminder 
that expert witnesses have a duty to give independent, impartial and unbiased 
evidence, and not to stray outside their area of expertise. Crucially, any reference 
to data that have been collected by others has to be justified, and their limitations 
communicated clearly. Similar considerations apply in civil cases14. 
The Forensic Science Regulator has the responsibility for reporting standards used 
by forensic experts and reports must be structured to provide an understanding of 
the probative value of the evidence. Crucially, legal professionals should be able 
to recognise complex and non-standard situations in which an expert in probability, 
forensic inference or statistical reasoning may need to be consulted.
Communication of probability is fraught with the potential for misunderstanding. One 
only has to look at the classic problem of the prosecutor’s fallacy to see what may 
happen when such misunderstanding occurs. Judgments from the Court of Appeal (in 
England and Wales) relating to expert evidence also reveal a variation in the way in 
which the Court understands and accepts or rejects probabilistic evidence. In some 
ways, this misunderstanding reflects a basic difference in the manner by which people 
reason and discuss issues. Some prefer a narrative style of argument while others prefer 
a numerical approach. This difference does not necessarily correlate with whether you 
are a scientist or a lawyer. 
It is important also to recognise with whom the expert is attempting to communicate. 
In a criminal court it will be with the magistrates or the jury; in civil litigation it will be 
with the judge. The onus is on the expert to use simple and accurate language in the 
communication of their evidence so that they are understood. It is equally important that 
the lawyers ask the experts questions such that the full nature of the evidence together 
with its strengths and limitations are exposed to the recipients (magistrates, judge, jury). 
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The Forensic Science Regulator is developing a quality standard for forensic 
practitioners on the development of evaluative opinions. This will set out a standardised, 
transparent approach to the expression of opinions for forensic science disciplines, 
based on case-specific propositions. Where it is not possible for numerical values to  
be assigned to probabilities, a revised verbal scale, with fewer categories than 
presented in Table 1, is being considered. The standard is also expected to require 
each expert to set out the specific data and/or experience and expertise on which their 
evaluation is based.
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5. Conclusions and the future
As forensic tests become more sensitive, and the amount and complexity of scientific 
evidence increases, there will be a need for more sophisticated models and statistics 
to obtain meaningful inferences and interpretation of the evidence given the specific 
circumstances of a case. This includes the generation of ground truth datasets (where 
the provenance of the data is known) relating to trace evidence and pattern evidence 
as well as an understanding of the transfer, persistence, recovery and background 
abundance of materials in general and in case-specific circumstances. The development 
of concepts of ‘calibrated knowledge’ and their use in decision-making in respect to 
the generation of propositions and the evaluation of these propositions within the 
context of cases are highly relevant. There is an increasing use of LR calculations for 
pattern evidence where the LR is obtained by dividing two probability assignments. Both 
require judgement on the part of the expert based on a corpus of knowledge that can 
be divided into two broad categories:
[S] Knowledge derived from robust systematic studies, ideally published, where the 
relevant features have been measured and studied statistically.
[E] Knowledge derived from personal experience, ie the expert’s training and 
professional experience in their forensic specialism.
Published scientific data are used wherever possible as a basis for these assessments.  
If relevant published data are not available, then data from unpublished sources or 
ad hoc experiments may be used as long as they have been peer reviewed and 
documented on file. Knowledge such as personal experience in similar cases and 
peer consultations may be used provided that the practitioner can justify their use 
and demonstrate their basis15. In addition to the nature of the knowledge invoked, it 
is critically important that the expert discloses transparently the nature, provenance, 
extent and relevancy of the knowledge used to inform their LR. Transparency is 
paramount to ensure scrutiny and ultimately to allow courts to assess credibility, ie 
how LRs were derived and their robustness. Because LRs may be based on different 
experts’ knowledge, there may be a legitimate and understandable difference in opinion 
between two experts.
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These developments will require improvements to the content of expert reports, to 
the competence of counsel to understand such reports and interrogate experts and to 
the ability of the judiciary to handle such evidence appropriately. These improvements 
will require actions by many stakeholders, including the Forensic Science Regulator 
to set standards for reporting, the academic and professional bodies to agree that the 
education of legal professionals should include dealing with scientific evidence, and 
training related to scientific evidence and its evaluation within the judicial colleges. 
The lack of a common language among experts, lawyers, judges and lay people  
about what is meant by probability and statistics and how these concepts are used  
by experts to provide answers to specific case-related questions remains challenging. 
This can lead to misunderstandings and confusion.
There are also gaps in data and knowledge related to many types of evidence, including 
how materials transfer between people and between people and surfaces. Similarly, 
data on the persistence of materials once transferred and on background abundance 
of materials are sparse. This requires a greater reliance on the expert’s knowledge and 
understanding of evidence and applying this to specific case circumstances.
In some circumstances where data are well known and well defined (eg repetitive 
measurements made by a scientific instrument) significance testing (Appendix 4) can 
be undertaken to provide a fundamental tool in uncovering relevant information about 
the data and what inferences can be made. An example may be the measurement 
of uncertainty or error relating to the determination of alcohol or drugs in a sample. 
Concepts such as causation and relative risk (Appendix 5) can be explored with the help 
of statistical methods; however, the significance of such associations remains primarily a 
matter of expert judgement.
This primer forms only a basic introduction to the evaluation of evidence based on 
statistical and probabilistic reasoning.
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Appendix 1: The use of probability
Probability in a legal context 
With the exception of evidence that is eliminative, scientific findings rarely provide 
evidence that is conclusive for a particular questioned event. The probative value of 
scientific findings needs to be assessed and taken into account by the fact-finders when 
considering whether a contested event in the past, for example whether the defendant 
committed the offence, is true. The notion of probability applies not only to the ultimate 
question but also to intermediate questions, such as: What is the probability that the 
defendant grabbed the victim’s (complainer in Scotland) clothing at the relevant time?
In criminal cases, the fact-finder must believe beyond reasonable doubt and be sure 
that the event occurred. There have been attempts to define what ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ and to ‘be sure’ mean in numerical, probabilistic terms but there is no agreement 
on, or even a strong drive to adopt, a particular number. 
In contrast, the fact-finder in civil cases relies on the concept of balance of probabilities. 
One common understanding is that the fact-finder must form a judgement, based on the 
strength of the evidence, as to whether their belief for the plaintiff’s contention is greater 
than or less than 50%. The notion of probability may also be invoked in court when 
expert evidence is being adduced. 
As an example, suppose the court is being presented with evidence of a particular 
bloodstain pattern in a case of assault. The expert testifies that it is ‛highly probable’ 
the bloodstain pattern would be observed on the defendant’s shoes if the defendant 
had, as alleged, kicked the victim. The notion here is of ‛observations’ and expert 
expectations of observing material/analytical results, etc if a proposition were true rather 
than to discuss the ‘cause’ of the bloodstain pattern. Discussion of ‘cause’ requires the 
generation of explanations after the observations have been made.
To avoid possible confusion, the expert should explain to the court that ‛highly probable’ 
is a description of their expectation that this particular pattern of bloodstaining on the 
defendant’s shoes would have been observed if the defendant had, as alleged, kicked 
the victim. But, for balance, it is necessary also to ask: What is the probability that this 
pattern of bloodstaining would have been observed if the defendant had not kicked the 
victim? The answer to this second question may be, for example, ‛very low’.
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These assignments are the expert's probability judgements made after taking into 
account the results of any experimentation aligned to the case circumstances, the body 
of documented knowledge and data in the specialism, as well as their own experience 
in the field. There are no such things as the ‛right’ or ‛correct’ probabilities in this case. 
Expert explanations, or expressions of possibility 
There is a form of expert opinion that does not involve assessment of probability and is 
classified16 as an explanation (possibility). Phrases that an expert will use to express an 
explanation include ‛consistent with’, ‛could have’ and ‛cannot exclude’. For example, 
the expert may explain that “the finding of a fibre on the clothing of a suspect which 
is indistinguishable from fibres of the complainer’s clothing could be the result of 
secondary rather than primary transfer”. Such explanations, however, are generally 
unhelpful for fact-finders when deciding on the truth of a contested event because 
merely presenting explanations bears the potential of suggesting that the expert is 
opining directly on the probability of the competing versions of the event rather than on 
the value of the findings within the framework of circumstances of the alleged activities. 
Explanations may offer assistance during the investigative proceedings but are 
limited insofar as there is no assessment of the probative value of the findings. The 
explanations may not be an exhaustive list of possibilities and there is no assessment 
of how probable each explanation may be, rendering them generally not useful for 
decision-making. However, while exploring alternative explanations (causes) for the 
evidence is a perfectly valid procedure before a trial, questions about alternative 
explanations may be posed later in court by defence counsel to dilute the force of  
the principal conclusions.
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The basis for assigning probabilities 
All probability assignments can be viewed as being conditioned on some form of  
pre-existing information. That information could include relevant details of the 
circumstances of the case in question, actuarial data, technical data, expert knowledge, 
results of competency testing, etc. It is important for all those people who use and rely 
on probability assignments to understand the notion of conditioning. 
It is important for the people who make probability assignments to declare the 
conditioning factors that have influenced those assignments – and it is important for the 
recipients of expert information to probe the foundations of those declarations. It is also 
vital that the fact-finder is made fully aware of those influences. The type and quantity 
of conditioning information taken into account will vary depending on, first, the role of 
the person assigning the probability within the fact-finding process and, second, the 
question being asked. 
For some roles and some types of question, the basis for assigning a probability may be 
straightforward, but for others assigning a probability may be problematic because of a 
lack of knowledge or a lack of relevant data or because it is not within the competence 
of the person being asked the question. Case studies 2 and 3 provide two examples in 
a criminal context to illustrate the sources of expert probability assignments.
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CASE STUDY 2
A DNA case
The fact-finder is presented with expert evidence of matching DNA profiles extracted 
from a sample from a defendant and from a bloodstain left at the scene of a crime. 
A question for the fact-finder would be: Is the DNA extracted and analysed from 
the bloodstain that of the defendant? And the ultimate question would be: Is the 
defendant guilty of an offence? It is the fact-finder’s role to answer the two questions. 
Whether they do so probabilistically is entirely their choice. It is not the expert’s role 
to answer the two questions, however tempting it may be to answer the first question. 
What the expert can do is to provide the fact-finder with their expert, justified view on 
the probability of observing the DNA evidence, ie DNA profile from the bloodstain and 
the defendant’s DNA profile, under two competing propositions. If we look at the first 
question, the pair of competing propositions would be:
• Hp (the prosecution proposition): The DNA originated from the defendant. 
• Hd (the defence proposition): The DNA originated from someone unrelated to  
the defendant.
The expert can help the fact-finder by providing their probability of obtaining the DNA 
evidence if the DNA had originated from the defendant and, alternatively, if it had 
originated from someone unrelated to the defendant. 
 
THE USE OF STATISTICS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 33
The first probability assignment, ie the probability of obtaining the DNA  
evidence if the DNA from the scene had come from the defendant, would be 
based on the expert’s knowledge of the reliability of the process of DNA profiling 
in producing the true profile from a stain. The expert should base their assessment 
on whatever relevant data there may be. Turning to the alternative proposition, 
additional considerations for assigning a probability of the DNA evidence come 
into play. Under the proposition that the DNA had originated from someone 
unrelated to the defendant, the probability of obtaining a match with the defendant 
depends additionally on the proportion of individuals who have this DNA type in 
the relevant population. 
There are databases of DNA profiles from samples of people from various  
ethnic groupings. These databases can be consulted to assess the rarity of the 
(matching) DNA profile. That statistic can then be used as a basis, among other 
considerations (such as genetic relationships among individuals), for assigning a 
probability of obtaining a match IF the bloodstaining had originated from someone 
unrelated to the defendant. What the expert brings to that assignment is knowledge  
and understanding of the impact of relatedness among people, in the form of a 
population-genetic model, and of choosing the most relevant database(s) for the case 
in question. It is not just a simple question of using a frequency of occurrence as a 
probability: a more subtle treatment is required.
CASE STUDY 2
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CASE STUDY 3
A firearm discharge residue case 
A person has been accused of discharging a firearm during the commission of a 
robbery. The firearm was not recovered but spent cartridge cases were found at the 
scene. Swabs were taken from the hands of the defendant about five hours after 
the incident. Subsequent chemical analysis of the swabs revealed the presence of a 
small amount of firearm discharge residue (FDR, also called a gunshot residue, GSR) 
that had the same qualitative composition as the reference FDR recovered from the 
cartridge cases. 
The fact-finder’s questions would include: Did the FDR on the defendant’s hand  
swabs come from the gun that fired the cartridges? And: What is the probability that 
the defendant fired the gun, given matching FDR had been found? The expert’s 
role is to offer probabilities for observing the particular FDR, given the truth of the 
prosecution proposition and defence alternative that flow from the questions facing 
the fact-finder. Looking at the issue of whether the defendant fired the gun, the two 
competing propositions would be: 
• Hp: The defendant fired the gun (at the relevant time).
• Hd: The defendant did not fire the gun (it was some other person).
Note that, for a sensible definition of the alternative proposition, it is relevant to 
enquire, if possible, about what the defendant says. There may be situations in  
which the defendant asserts that he was a bystander, or that he provided first aid to 
the victim. These details are relevant to help specify the alternative proposition and 
task-relevant conditioning information. Defining the alternative proposition as the 
simple negation of the prosecution’s proposition is usually not sufficient. The expert 
should be able to offer probabilities for obtaining the FDR evidence given the truth 
of these propositions. 
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CASE STUDY 3
The task to be addressed is that the propositions are contested – we do not know 
which of the competing propositions is true. Did the defendant or someone else fire 
the gun? The principles of inductive logic (where the conclusion may be probable 
based upon the evidence presented) dictate that, to assess the probability that an 
uncertain proposition is true, the probabilities of the evidence under the competing 
propositions need to be considered (see Section 2.5 on doping). So, how does the 
expert assign such probabilities? 
Under the first proposition 
The defendant fired the gun (at the relevant time): the expert would rely on whatever  
is known generally about transfer and persistence of FDR and apply that knowledge  
to assign a probability for obtaining the evidence under this proposition. The expert  
may consider undertaking experiments to replicate as far as possible the conditions  
of the incident, to provide more data and knowledge. The probability that they assign 
will be their best assessment of the probability of obtaining the evidence. Other  
experts may disagree with the assignment but, with transparent communication and 
explanation, the expert should be able to demonstrate and justify how they arrived 
at a particular probability. 
Under the alternative proposition 
The defendant did not fire the gun (at a relevant time, it was some other person): 
the expert would use whatever survey or other data there may be to help them 
consider the probability of obtaining the evidence under this proposition, and given 
the task-relevant information. Again, this will be the expert’s considered view on that 
probability. Generally, the body of knowledge upon which the expert relies should be 
available for auditing and disclosure.
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How do we know if the expert’s probability assignments are reliable?  
The answer to that lies, first, in the expert being able to explain in a transparent 
way the basis of their assignment and, second, in the expert revealing the results 
of any relevant calibration of their past opinions through, for example, competency 
testing. The expert should be able to defend their opinion upon challenge. Through 
transparency and effective explanation on the part of the expert, the fact-finder should 
be able to understand the basis of the declared probabilities and take a view on how 
to incorporate the expert’s opinion in the fact-finder’s own reasoning process.
How may experts use probability to assist fact-finders in their decision-making?  
It is important for all participants in the justice process to understand and be clear  
about several key issues and questions in the use of probability. These are:
• The essential distinction between probabilities for evidence (usually the expert’s 
observations and analytical results) and probabilities for propositions (ie the facts  
in issue). 
• Whether probabilities for propositions are being assigned before or after expert 
evidence is presented. If before the consideration of expert evidence, these 
probabilities are called prior probabilities; if after the presentation of expert evidence, 
they are called posterior probabilities (see Section 2.5 on the doping example).
• Who is best placed, in terms of their roles in the legal process, to provide these 
different types of probability?
• What is the information that has conditioned (or influenced) the assignment of 
probabilities to the propositions, and is it relevant to the task? 
Generally, the probabilities for obtaining expert observations, conditioned on the truth 
or otherwise of the proposition in question, are in the domain of the experts. The expert 
should have sufficient data and the knowledge and understanding of the evidence to 
assign defensible, informed probabilities. The expert should be able to convey and 
explain these probabilities to the fact-finder to help them deliberate on the truth or 
falsehood of the proposition in question. It is the fact-finder who has received other, 
non-expert evidence in a case and who is therefore in the best position to take a view 
on the truth of the proposition in question. However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule and 
there will be some situations in which the expert can provide informed probabilities for 
the truth of the proposition. 
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What are the limitations of using probability?  
Perhaps the main limitation is the lack of a common understanding among experts, 
lawyers, judges and lay people of the notion of probability and the extent  
to which it can be applied. Until there is a shared understanding and a common 
language about probability, and an agreement on how best to express probability,  
then misunderstandings and confusion will occur, resulting in expert evidence being 
valued inappropriately or perhaps ruled as inadmissible when it might be helpful and 
valid. Even among experts, there is misunderstanding about, and a variation in, the 
adoption of probability. In the field of DNA profiling, practitioners use probabilistic 
software for the logical interpretation of complex DNA mixtures. Without such software, 
the interpretation of such mixtures would be very difficult. Discussion of the potential 
and limitations of such software is provided in Forensic DNA analysis: a primer for 
the courts17. In other fields, however, practitioners are only just beginning to explore 
probabilistic thinking. The Royal Statistical Society and the Inns of Court College  
of Advocates have together produced guidance on the use of probability18 that 
provides a good starting point. 
Another limitation is the lack of relevant data to inform probabilities in some areas of 
expertise. In some areas, such as in textile fibres and ‛touch’ DNA, there is an extensive 
body of research and survey data on which to draw. In other areas, such as toolmarks 
or ballistics, there is only limited published research on important considerations 
relevant for assessing probative value. In the absence of reliable, informative and 
structured data, the expert must rely on their knowledge and understanding of the 
evidence type, provided that the basis of such opinion is documented, can be audited 
and is disclosed. It is in such areas particularly that evidence of the reliability of the 
expert’s opinions would be highly desirable.
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Appendix 2: Evaluation of trace evidence
Trace evidence refers to any material that is transferred between persons or objects 
during contact and is commonly recovered in connection with an alleged crime. The 
term is often used to refer to the collection of materials frequently encountered by 
forensic scientists such as glass, paint, fibres, firearm discharge residue and DNA. 
In forensic casework, the objective is often to compare known material and questioned 
material. Either can originate from the suspect or from the scene. Examples include 
glass from a window compared with glass fragments recovered from a suspect or fibres 
from a suspect’s jumper compared with recovered fibres from a victim. The material 
might be compared at the source level (eg are the fragments from the same window or 
not?) or at the activity level (eg did the suspect break the window or not?). Source level 
is rarely sufficient to assist the questions relevant to the case. Glass recovered from 
a suspect that is indistinguishable from a broken window is of little value without an 
assessment of how probable such a finding is if the suspect broke the window versus 
that the suspect had nothing to do with the breaking.
In order to tackle the question of source, forensic laboratory analysis is typically 
undertaken to measure different features or characteristics of the known and 
questioned material. To interpret the weight of the evidence (or likelihood ratio (LR)) 
when comparing material at the source-level usually requires evaluating the similarity 
of the features of the two sets of material (how closely they match each other based on 
the analysis undertaken) and the rarity of the observed features. The rarer the features 
observed, the stronger the evidence may be. See Appendix 3 for more details on 
source-level comparisons. 
Analysing trace evidence at the source level alone, without reference to the activities 
associated with the evidence, can be misleading. It is often the case that the most 
relevant questions are related to the activities which may have led to the trace 
materials being transferred. In order to obtain results that are helpful to address these 
questions and that are not misleading, other factors need to be considered in addition 
to the source-level questions. These other factors include the probabilities of transfer, 
persistence and recovery of the material in the context of the alleged activities. 
Statistical approaches which only assess the similarity and rarity of the materials can 
miss factors which affect relevance within the context of the circumstances of a given 
case – this can have a major impact on the evidential weight of the findings.
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Trace evidence must be viewed in the context of the case. As described in Section 
2, at least two competing propositions should be addressed. In addressing these for 
a specific case, the expert considers how probable the findings are in each of these 
competing propositions. The result is presented in the form of an LR. This highlights 
that the results do not have a stand-alone value; rather, their value is dependent on the 
proposition being addressed or the questions to be answered.
The issues to be considered to address activity-level propositions are similar for all 
trace materials but the factors affecting the issues vary from one material to another. 
To assess how probable it is to find matching materials (glass, fibres, etc) if a particular 
action took place, data on transfer, persistence and recovery are needed as well as data 
on how common the materials under consideration are in the environment. Levels of 
background abundance are also needed when considering the findings if the alternative 
is true, ie that the activity did not take place or was not carried out by the suspect.  
An example is knowing the background abundance of groups of glass fragments which 
would be found on clothing in a given population. Sometimes, where insufficient data 
are available, expert judgement or personal opinion are used to assign the required 
probabilities. This should be made explicit in the report. Ideally ad hoc experiments 
should be carried out in the absence of data.
Assumptions and data  
When evaluating LRs for trace evidence, statistical assumptions are needed both at 
the source level and at the activity level. For example, it may be assumed that the 
distribution of measurements follows a particular statistical model or that two events 
that are alleged to have occurred are statistically independent of one another. These 
assumptions will depend on the type of evidence and the competing propositions being 
considered. For some evidence types and propositions, the statistical assumptions are 
well understood and validated. For others the methods are less well developed. When 
analysing evidence at the activity level, propositions can be very case dependent. As 
a result, the statistical approaches and datasets used to evaluate the evidence may be 
based on the personal judgement of the forensic expert. 
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Where any statistical assumptions or datasets have been used to evaluate evidence, 
these should be clearly explained and justified in the case report. It is important that 
checks have been carried out to test whether the statistical assumptions used are 
appropriate for the evidence type and the propositions being assessed. One way of 
doing this is to test the statistical approach on an existing dataset where the ground 
truth is known and to assess the proportion of times that the LR gives a misleading 
or incorrect result.  
For example, for a source-level comparison this would mean evaluating the proportion 
of times that the LR is greater than 1 when the two sets of material are from different 
sources and the proportion of times that the LR is less than 1 when the two sets of 
material are from the same source. Both proportions should be small in a model that 
fits the evidence type for which it is being used. 
Fibres 
Fibres are shed from surfaces of various materials such as clothing, carpets  
and car seats. They vary greatly in composition and colour. Studies have found that 
fibres which are common, such as blue wool, have not been detected on surfaces 
in high numbers except in areas where a known source has been in contact. Hence, 
fibres can be very useful in reconstructing the activities that occurred during the contact 
between textiles. The tendency to shed fibres is governed by many factors, including 
the looseness of the weave, the size of the fibres and the age of the garment. This is 
easy to visualise when we consider the difference between the shedding of a new 
carpet and that of one that has been in place for some time. 
Whether fibres transfer or not depends on the shedability and on the type of contact. 
Information on both factors is needed to assess the range of fibres likely to be 
transferred. A smooth shell suit will not be expected to yield transferred fibres even 
if the contact is prolonged while a woollen jumper will give rise to transferred fibres 
with limited contact. Little peer reviewed published literature exists in relation to the 
shedability of fibres. These considerations highlight why case context is important 
in assigning the probabilities of the findings in competing scenarios. Fibres are best 
considered in the totality of the case and it is rarely useful to consider only their 
sources or the presence of a single fibre.
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Transfers of fibres can be by direct contact (eg from the suspect’s clothes to the 
victim’s clothes) or by indirect contact (eg fibres transferred from the victim’s clothes  
to the suspect’s clothes via an intermediary object); the latter is called secondary 
transfer. It is not possible for the expert to opine on whether the transfer of fibres was 
primary or secondary transfer, or whether or not the transfer occurred during the alleged 
activity. However, fibre experts are well placed to assess the probability of particular 
findings in either scenario. 
Example 1: competing sources of fibres 
A sexual assault is reported as having taken place in the bedroom of a residence. 
This is denied by the suspect, who alleges that consensual sex occurred in the living 
room and that he never entered the bedroom. Fibres are an ideal evidence type to 
help distinguish between these two scenarios. For example, a large number of fibres 
indistinguishable from the bedcover would be expected to be recovered from the 
suspect’s socks and fibres indistinguishable from the socks and the bedcover would be 
expected to be recovered from the victim if the assault took place in the bedroom. 
A large number of fibres indistinguishable from the bedcover would not be expected  
to be recovered from the suspect’s socks given the alternative scenario. In this case, the 
LR (ie the weight to be assigned to the findings) would involve the relative consideration 
of these probabilities and the pair of competing propositions would be: 
• Hp: The assault took place in the bedroom.
• Hd: Consensual sex took place in the living room.
Given the above assignments, if a large number of matching fibres were obtained,  
we would expect a value of the LR above 1, supporting the proposition that the  
assault occurred in the bedroom. The actual values for the probabilities will depend on 
factors such as the tendency of the socks and the bedcover to shed fibres, the time 
between the incident and the seizure and examination of the items, the frequency of 
occurrence of fibre types in given situations and the statistical assumptions used to 
link these factors together. The number of recovered indistinguishable fibres from the 
bedcover are relevant because it is possible that a small number of bedcover fibres 
may be present in the living room. Much of this becomes a matter of professional 
judgement and experience.
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Example 2: missing fibre types 
In an alleged assault, the victim (complainer in Scotland) is wearing a green T-shirt 
and the suspect a red football supporter’s jersey. The jersey is found to consist of a 
range of coloured polyester and cotton fibres. Shedding tests show that the fibres 
shed in roughly equal proportions. The red polyester fibres recovered from the victim’s 
T-shirt are found to be indistinguishable from the suspect’s jersey but no cotton fibres 
are recovered. No green fibres matching the victim’s T-shirt are recovered from the 
suspect’s jersey. Here we have an example of the findings not fitting the expectations 
in the context of the case. The pair of competing propositions would be:
• Hp: The suspect grappled with the victim at a given time.
• Hd: The suspect never had any contact with the victim. 
With the information above, the expert will inform that the findings are unlikely given Hp 
but more expected given Hd. The LR will be less than 1, ie supporting Hd.
This example is designed to highlight the necessity of considering the findings in 
competing scenarios and considering the context of the case. The matching red fibres 
viewed in isolation are misleading no matter how robust the analytical tests applied or 
how rare are the fibre types.
Glass
When a window is broken a large number of fragments fall back in the direction of the 
blow. Thus, a person delivering the blow is expected to have small fragments in their 
hair or on the surface of their clothing depending on how close they were to the window 
as it was breaking, the height of the window, the type of glass and the activities that 
followed19. One of the main tests used to examine glass fragments at the source level 
consists of measuring the refractive index, which varies both within a pane of glass 
and between sources of glass. The refractive indices of the glass fragments from the 
window are measured and glass fragments from the suspect are also analysed and put 
into matching and non-matching groups of glass if glass of more than one refractive 
index is present20. However, assessing the closeness of the ‘match’ between glass 
recovered from clothing and the window glass does not provide sufficient information 
to evaluate propositions concerning whether or not the suspect broke the window. 
Even when additional analytical tests are applied, this activity-related question is not 
answered. Other information is required relating to, for example, how glass fragments 
are transferred and retained following the breaking of glass objects, or how prevalent 
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glass fragments are on surfaces not directly connected to a recent break.  
Glass fragments can be exchanged following a large range of daily activities.
To evaluate the glass fragment results, information is needed on how probable the 
findings are if the suspect broke the window(s) against how probable the findings 
are if the suspect had nothing to do with breaking the window(s). To address the first 
probability, two possible ways that the glass fragments can arise must be considered 
– either fragments were transferred when the window was broken and non-matching 
glass, if present, was already on the clothing or no glass was transferred from the 
window and all the glass on the clothing, both matching and non-matching, was 
already there. To assess the probability of the findings (ie glass matching the window 
found on the clothing), if the suspect had nothing to do with breaking the glass, we 
need information on the probability of finding glass on innocent members of the 
population. This information is critical, and it is useful to consider a population as close 
to the suspect as possible. One well-known dataset considers glass on the clothing of 
persons who come to the attention of the police rather than the general population. 
Firearm discharge residue (FDR) 
FDR is a combination of small particles produced when a gun is fired following the 
explosion in the barrel. This evidence type is complicated, consisting of a non-uniform 
population of particles which includes so-called ‘unique’ particles containing lead, 
barium and antimony. However, to be considered FDR, other characteristic particles 
also need to be present. Accepting this means that a single particle is not FDR.
Different ammunitions give rise to different residues, but a very high number have 
similar compositions providing little discrimination. Even when the ammunition type is 
known, it is considered good practice to compare residue from the discharged cartridge 
case, barrel of the gun or the bullet hole – the known material(s) – and the residue 
recovered from the hands or clothing of the suspect – the questioned material(s). This is 
because variation in the proportions of particles can occur. It is common to see reports 
from forensic scientists in which the number of particles recovered is factually reported, 
or a statement that FDR was detected. Such statements can often be accompanied by 
a disclaimer that the findings are ‘consistent with’ the suspect being close to a person 
firing the gun or touching a surface with firearm residue on it. Similarly, a negative 
finding is explained away by loss or time delay. The evaluation of the meaning of such 
findings in the context of the case is generally left out of the report. 
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However, as with other trace evidence types, the more relevant question is whether 
or not the suspect undertook an activity which could result in the scientific findings. In 
the case of FDR, it is more meaningful to address whether the findings are more or less 
likely if the person fired or did not fire the gun in the circumstances of the case. These 
assessments will go beyond statements of consistency but should be qualified  
in terms of probability. 
Example  
In a given set of circumstances, the expert may indicate that the probability of finding 
FDR on a person who fired a gun is high if the person is sampled soon after the gun had 
been fired. That expectation will be balanced against the probability of the finding if the 
suspect did not fire the gun. The latter probability is low as surveys on members of the 
general population show few instances of FDR. Depending on the circumstances, finding 
FDR on a person’s hands is expected to provide support for firing of a gun rather than not 
firing a gun, ie the LR will be greater than 1. 
To inform these probabilities and assign a meaningful LR, information is needed on the 
type of weapon and length of time between the alleged firing and sampling. Ideally, tests 
should be carried out under the conditions of the known circumstances of the case. 
Data regarding the presence of FDR as a background in a given population (of individuals 
or objects) is also required to assess how prevalent the material may be considering 
activities other than discharging a firearm. At the current time the understanding of the 
transfer, persistence, recovery and background abundance of FDR is limited.
Drugs on banknotes  
Banknotes seized from people who have been found guilty of drug crime on average 
have higher levels of drug contamination than banknotes found in general circulation. 
Different analytical techniques can be used to obtain measurements of drug traces 
on banknotes and can result in different measurements. Hence it is important that 
comparisons are made using datasets obtained using the same analytical technique. For 
some drugs (eg cocaine, which is found on most banknotes) the measurements of drug 
found on the set of seized banknotes are related to the quantities of drug on the notes. 
For other drugs (such as heroin) the measurements might simply be the presence or 
absence of the drug on each banknote. 
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The strength of this evidence in relation to the following propositions can be evaluated 
using an LR and the pair of competing propositions would be:
• Hp: The banknotes are associated with a person involved in drug crime. 
• Hd: The banknotes are from general circulation. 
Statistical models can be used to evaluate the LR; for some examples, see Wilson 
et al.21. The assumptions behind the statistical models must be checked and the 
models validated. Selecting suitable databases for these statistical models can be a 
challenge22 as there may be both regional variations and variations over time associated 
with particular drug use behaviours in different areas. Having relevant localised 
ground truth data (analysed samples from known locations over different known time 
periods) is essential to assess whether this is the case. It is important that the datasets 
are consistent with the propositions. For example, if the propositions are specific 
to a particular drug, then the dataset should also be specific to that drug over the 
appropriate time period. It is also difficult to obtain a dataset of banknotes ‛associated 
with a person involved in drug crime’, which can make it difficult to estimate the 
probability of the findings under Hp. It is therefore key that the statistical assumptions 
supporting data selection are described and justified. 
Many of the general guidelines described in the four scenarios presented  
above are applicable to other types of evidence. The same can be said of the 
challenges posed by the limited availability of ground truth databases and lack of 
experimental studies for estimating transfer, persistence and recovery probabilities 
for most types of trace evidence. Going forward, another challenge will be to keep 
up with emerging materials such as glass for smartphones and organic ammunition 
for guns. Successful quantification of the evidential value of such trace evidence 
and understanding of the limitations of the methods developed will depend on the 
availability of reliable databases and experiments simulating case scenarios for the 
different types of trace evidence. It will also rely on appropriate probabilistic and 
statistical models, which will need to be tested and validated for each type of trace 
evidence and for different sets of competing propositions.
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Appendix 3: Evaluation of  
impression evidence
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the type and significance of the conclusions 
reached by forensic experts dealing with impression evidence. It will also explain the 
basis (statistical or otherwise) upon which these conclusions are formed.
What is ‛impression evidence’?
The term ‘impression evidence’ is used here to refer to the field of forensic examination 
in which an expert is asked to compare, primarily using visual methods, items of 
disputed source with items of known source. These items are called ‘impressions’ 
because they are marks or signs left by a person or an object following physical contact 
with a surface. The field covers a large number of forensic specialisms, each having its  
own terminology when referring to these impressions (Table 3). In this appendix, 
the generic term of ‘impression’ will be used when the argument holds for all types 
of impressions. When making examples in a given forensic specialism, its specific 
terminology will be used.
Questioned impressions are of disputed sources (a person or an object). They generally 
have been left unintentionally and recovered in association with the investigation of 
some criminal activity (eg a fingermark in blood recovered from a crime scene). Known 
impressions are of undisputed sources (person or object) and have been obtained 
under known and controlled conditions (eg reference fingerprints from a known 
individual taken in police custody).
What is the purpose of the forensic examination?
For all these specialisms, the purpose of the forensic examination is to help assess 
whether or not questioned impression(s) originated from the source(s) that produced the 
reference impressions. The issue can typically be phrased as follows:
• Were the (finger-/palm-) marks recovered at the scene left by this individual or by 
some other unknown person?
• Were the (footwear-/tool-) marks recovered at the scene made by this object  
(shoe or tool) or another unknown shoe or tool?
• Was the bullet recovered from a body fired by the seized firearm or by some  
other unknown firearm?
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Some forensic specialisms and relevant terminology.
TABLE 3
Forensic specialism 
(as colloquially referred to)
Questioned  
impression 
Known  
impressions
Fingerprint examination Fingermark
Palmmark
Finger prints
Palm prints
Barefoot examination  
(with no visible, friction-
ridge, skin impressions)
Barefoot mark Barefoot prints
Footwear mark examination Footwear mark Known shoes and their associated 
reference prints (reference prints 
taken in two dimensions or 
impressions in three dimensions)
Toolmark examination Toolmark Known tools and their associated 
reference impressions made on a 
soft surface
Firearm examination Marks on a questioned 
fired bullet
Marks on a questioned 
fired cartridge case
Known bullets fired by a weapon 
Known cartridges fired by a weapon
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It is important to stress that the issue of origin (or source) in all of these specialisms  
is generally associated with an implied activity made by a person or carried out using 
an object. It is these implied activities that led to the production of the questioned 
impressions (Table 4). 
These activities are often not referred to specifically in the expert’s report but remain 
implied. Indeed, experts will not systematically envisage all conceivable possibilities for 
a questioned impression to be produced but will consider the most reasonable activity 
arising from the case circumstances. For example, experts, unless instructed otherwise, 
will not account for fanciful scenarios such as:
• a fingermark not being left on the surface by a living hand but using a forged  
dummy finger obtained from an individual; and
• a footwear mark in the snow being the result of the landing of a shoe after being 
discarded from a car.
Implied activities resulting in the impression.
TABLE 4
Forensic specialism Implied activity 
Fingerprint examination The individual handled an object or touched a surface  
with bare hands.
Barefoot examination The individual walked barefoot on a surface.
Footwear mark examination A person wearing these shoes walked on the floor.
Toolmark examination A person using this tool forced the safe, the door or  
the window.
Firearm examination A person with that firearm fired a cartridge that led to a  
bullet and a cartridge case.
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How is the comparison work carried out? 
For all of the above forensic specialisms, the forensic examination of a given questioned 
impression starts with its analysis, where the examiner assesses the relevant visible 
features, gathers as much information as possible from the questioned impression 
alone and assesses if it can be used for comparison purposes. Questioned impressions 
deemed of no value will not be compared any further. The term ‘no value’ will 
typically be assigned to impressions showing insufficient detail to allow a meaningful 
comparison. Only impressions that are declared ‘of value’ will be compared (side by 
side or by superimposition) with potential sources in the form of known impressions. 
The potential sources have been generated either through police investigations (eg an 
arrest or a seizure) or by searching a database holding known impressions, attributed 
to individuals, that have been previously put on record. The comparison stage consists 
of deciding if the features of the questioned impression observed in analysis are in 
sufficiently close agreement or disagreement with the submitted known impressions. 
Relevant features are specific to the forensic specialism and are detailed in  
Table 5. They can be shared by many (such as the manufacturing size of a tool shared 
by all tools produced of that size) or by a few (such as the acquired damage in the  
form of cuts on the outsole of a shoe). In other words, the discriminative power 
of relevant features varies depending on the specific type of feature considered. 
Furthermore, depending on their size and on how the impression is produced (types 
of surfaces, residue on the surface, movement, materials, etc), features may not be 
reproduced in the impressions and even when features are made by the same source 
(eg a shoe) impressions are never identical. Hence, features in disagreement may be 
found between impressions, despite sharing the same source. This is because the 
respective impressions have been subject to distortion, movement, superimposition or 
background noise or have changed appearance over time. On the other hand, while 
findings in agreement should be observed when the impressions were produced by 
a common source, they may also be found when they were produced by different 
sources. Matches between different sources are known as adventitious matches 
because another source has produced, by chance, the same level of agreement.
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Relevant features of different evidence types.
TABLE 5
Forensic specialism Relevant features (not exhaustive) 
Fingerprint examination The general flow of the friction-ridge skin (papillary lines), often 
classified in general patterns such as arches, loops and whorls.
The ridge endings and bifurcations (referred to as minutiae  
or Galton’s details) made by the papillary lines and the  
combination thereof.
The marks left by scars or other damage.
The specific shapes of edges of the papillary lines and the  
pores present in them.
Barefoot examination The size (length and width) of the foot from heel to toes and the 
relative size and position of the toe impressions.
Footwear mark 
examination
The overall manufacturing design of the outsole (the geometric 
elements of the design and how they are arranged relative to  
each other).
The size of the outsole as specified by the manufacturer. 
The general level of wear of the outsole at the time of the 
impressions.
The acquired features shown in the impressions in the form  
of cuts, removal of material or damage to the outsole.
Toolmark examination The width and size of the tool and its shape as given by the 
manufacturer.
The acquired defects on the surface, removal of material and small 
imperfections of the surface due to its usage.
Firearm examination The calibre, number, widths and twist of the lands and grooves of 
the barrel through which a bullet was fired. 
The relative positions of the firing pin, extractor and ejector coming 
in contact with a cartridge case.
The striated marks, due to usage, left on the impressions of lands 
and grooves on a fired bullet.
The breech face impression left on the back of the cartridge  
when fired.
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The results of all these observations on both the known-source and the questioned 
impression (in agreement or disagreement) are what will be called the comparison 
findings. These findings will then be evaluated with regards to the proposition 
of common source against the proposition of different sources. This evaluation 
stage encapsulates the interpretation of the findings and generation of associated 
conclusions. In the UK the evaluation is carried out holistically by the expert using their 
knowledge and experience. It is more infrequent that such an evaluation is undertaken 
using a likelihood ratio (LR) approach. However, such approaches are encouraged 
by forensic practitioners and are used elsewhere, particularly in continental Europe. 
Finally, it is customary for each examination followed by a conclusion to be reviewed 
independently by a second examiner. This is called the verification stage. The four 
above stages (analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification) are generally referred to 
by the acronym ACE-V. In the UK, it is common to use this approach for the comparison 
of fingerprint evidence but ACE-V is not necessarily used for other types of evidence 
involving the comparison of visual patterns.
What conclusions do experts reach following a comparison?
In all specialisms, it will be customary for the expert, when the comparison findings 
allow, to reach a conclusion of either an ‘identification’ or an ‘exclusion’. An identification 
is declared when the examiner is subjectively convinced that the mark could not have 
been made by any other source, even if all other possible sources have not been 
examined. This means that the expert takes a decision on the issue of the source of 
the impression. 
The term ‘identification’ refers to the decision of the expert that the questioned and 
known impressions originated from the same source. It is a categorical opinion, and 
should not be misconstrued as being a factual certainty. No forensic examination 
covered in this appendix can claim to factually demonstrate the source of a questioned 
impression. A decision of ‘identification’ is not a fact; it is the opinion of an expert based 
on their measurements, observations and experience and it is a statement of an expert’s 
probability that the impression was made by different sources other than the questioned 
source is so small that it is negligible. 
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The opinion of an ‘identification’ should not be taken as stating, for example:
• that the impression was associated with a specific individual or object to the 
exclusion of all others in the world; or 
• that it is absolutely certain (or with a 100% certainty) that a specific individual or an 
object is the source of the questioned impressions; or  
• that it is the result of the comparison of all impressions in the world’s population.
The term ‘exclusion’ refers to the decision of the expert that the questioned and known 
impressions did not originate from the same source; in other words, they have been 
produced by different sources. When a decision of ‘identification’ or ‘exclusion’ cannot 
be reached, the expert may either, depending on the forensic specialism: 
• indicate that the comparison is ‘inconclusive’; such a conclusion could be more  
than the expression of neutral findings but does not provide ‘certainty’ in the eyes  
of the examiner; or
• indicate the strength of support the findings will bring to the question of the source; 
that strength will be qualified either verbally or numerically.
Table 6 shows these options as practised in a few of the forensic specialisms 
considered. Resorting to ‘inconclusive’ as opposed to a more nuanced range  
of possibilities expressing graded degrees of support depends on the habit of the 
expert or on institutional/organisational policy. For example, while many fingerprint or 
firearm experts will only ever report ‘inconclusive’ in instances where they are unable  
to either ‘identify’ or ‘exclude’, other experts in those fields will qualify their 
‘inconclusive’ conclusions. 
How do experts decide on an identification or an exclusion? 
A decision on identification is taken by the expert when, in their opinion, there are 
insufficient features in disagreement to conclude that the impressions came from 
different sources and that the observed features (between questioned and known 
impressions) are in sufficient correspondence such that the expert would not expect 
to see them repeated if that impression came from a different source. As indicated 
before, these conclusions are not facts and the expert must concede that there is 
some probability, however small, that their decision might be erroneous. 
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A conclusion of ‘inconclusive’ means that no categorical decisions (‘identification’  
or ‘exclusion’) have been made and that no meaningful assessment of its value is 
given to the court. This may be due to various reasons, among them the low quality of 
the impressions, the failure of the known impressions to fully represent the source, or 
comparison findings that are not judged sufficiently discriminating to make a categorical 
decision. However, the findings in such an ‘inconclusive’ case may still provide support 
one way or the other towards the issue of source. In such cases, depending on the 
forensic specialism, the expert may provide guidance as to the weight to be assigned  
to these comparison findings in favour of the proposition of common source or of 
different sources. 
This can be done by expressing the degree of support that the findings provide in 
favour or against these propositions using an LR based on a qualitative assessment for 
impression evidence and expressed using a scale such as that provided in Table 1. 
Some of the range of conclusions reached.
TABLE 6
Conclusions Meaning of conclusions 
Exclusion Exclusion
Inconclusive The findings provide (qualified) support for the questioned 
impression originating from another source rather than the  
source under examination.
The findings do not provide support either for the source  
under examination or for another source.
The findings provide (qualified) support for the questioned 
impression originating from the source under examination  
rather than another source.
Identification Identification
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For example, in a case involving a footwear mark where the expert noted a 
correspondence between a mark and a sole in terms of overall design, size, general 
level of wear and the presence of three cuts located in the heel area, and there is no 
significant discrepancy, they may state:
• the comparison findings, in my opinion, provide extremely strong support  
for the view that the mark has been left by that sole as opposed to some other  
sole; or  
• the comparison findings are more than 1,000 times more likely to be observed if  
the mark has been left by that sole rather than if the mark has been left by some 
other sole. 
If the findings had been different, for example if the general level of wear on both the 
mark and the sole were different and not easily reconcilable (with potential additional 
wear over the time period between the recovery of the mark and its seizure), the expert 
may express (reversing the propositions): 
• that the comparison findings, in my opinion, provide moderate support for the view 
that the mark has been left by some other sole; or 
• that the comparison findings are between 10 and 100 times more likely to be 
observed if the mark has been left by some other sole.
The LR is always assigned numerically first and then, if so chosen, translated into a verbal 
expression. In most cases involving impression evidence, the LR will be expressed 
by an order of magnitude (10, 100, 1,000, 10,000, 1,000,000, etc). If this methodology is 
used then an LR should be the prerequisite required to reach any conclusion, including 
an identification or exclusion decision. An LR is obtained by dividing two probability 
assignments. Both require judgement on the part of the expert based on a corpus of 
knowledge that can be divided into two broad categories:
[S] Knowledge derived from robust systematic studies, ideally published, where the 
relevant features have been measured and studied statistically.
[E] Knowledge derived from personal experience, ie the expert’s training and 
professional experience in the forensic specialism.
Because LRs may be based on different experts’ knowledge, there may be a legitimate 
and understandable difference in opinion between two experts. Table 7 gives, for a few 
specialisms, examples of the type of knowledge used by experts.
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Types of knowledge used in some forensic specialisms.
TABLE 7
Forensic specialism Nature of the knowledge used by the examiner to assign a likelihood 
ratio (LR) 
Fingerprint 
examination
[S]  Relative frequencies of fingerprint general patterns or of types of 
minutiae observed on fingerprints. LR computations obtained from 
a statistical model.
[E]  Knowledge on the distortion marks may show in comparison with 
their corresponding prints owing, for example, to the elasticity of 
the skin or the movements of the hand when grasping an object. 
Personal experience derived from the systematic observations of 
fingerprints from different individuals.
Footwear mark 
examination
[S]  Studies on the relative frequencies of the general designs of the 
outsoles and their sizes in the selected population. Data showing 
how wear develops on used outsoles.
[E]  Knowledge of the variations in size between a mark and its 
corresponding shoe owing to its deposition on the floor. Knowledge 
on the occurrence and persistence of inclusions such as stones 
caught between polyurethane structures of the outsole.
Firearm examination [S]  Studies associated with the systematic search of matching features 
occurring on bullets fired by different firearms. Data associated with 
the evolution of striated features on bullets due to their successive 
firings in a given barrel.
[E]  Knowledge of how features produced by the manufacturing  
process can be distinguished from features acquired through the 
use of a firearm.
Barefoot 
examination
[S]  Studies on the variability observed between features measured on 
barefoot impressions from different individuals.
[E]  Knowledge of the variations between barefoot impressions from 
the same donor. The variations can be due to the donor, the walked 
surface or the residue left on the surface (eg blood).
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Before an expert decides on an identification or an exclusion, they assess the 
comparison findings in the form of an LR. The expert decides an identification when 
the LR is sufficiently high in their opinion to safely take that decision bearing in mind 
all other relevant evidence. Conversely, the expert decides an exclusion when the 
LR is sufficiently low for them to decide accordingly. What represents an LR as being 
sufficiently high or sufficiently low cannot be precisely defined and has an element 
of subjective judgement.
Use of a likelihood ratio approach in practice in the UK 
The explicit use of the LR approach for the interpretation of impression evidence is 
not yet the norm in the UK in all specialisms involving impression evidence but may 
be used for some evidence types (such as footwear comparison). The LR should be 
used as a measure of support for hypotheses in regards to identification or exclusion 
of a potential source in the context of impression evidence. This re-emphasises that 
the decision reached by the expert is an expression of personal belief and not a 
statement of fact. For example, if an expert when concluding a fingerprint identification 
ultimately decided for themselves that, given the LR, the identification can be made and 
that the risk of an erroneous identification is, for them and in the case circumstances, 
acceptable, then this may be incorrect. Information not known to the expert (eg that 
the defendant was in prison at the time of the alleged burglary where marks have 
been left) may provide a completely different perspective on the case, requiring the 
expert to revise their opinion. An opinion of ‘identification’ in these circumstances goes 
beyond the assessment of the comparison of findings and requires that the expert 
takes into account additional elements not of a scientific nature (eg the broad number 
of individuals or objects that could be the source of the impression). In these forensic 
specialisms, where the court allows the expert to consider non-scientific evidence, the 
court defers to the expert on the issue of the source of an impression. That delegation 
of the source decision has been the general practice in the UK. However, if courts 
decide not to allow experts to go that far, then the LR would be an appropriate way to 
express the strength of the expert’s findings.
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Appendix 4: Statistical significance
Significance testing is a fundamental tool for scientific discovery that is widely used 
in medical and other scientific literature as a basis for making claims. The logic of the 
procedure is somewhat analogous to a criminal case. The steps for a significance test 
are as follows:
• A null hypothesis is presented. This is generally the proposition that the discovery is 
false, eg a pharmaceutical has no beneficial effect or the Higgs boson does not exist. 
This null hypothesis is set up as a default assumption and is only rejected if there is 
sufficiently convincing evidence. 
• A test statistic is chosen, for which large values would tend to cast doubt on the null 
hypothesis. For example, the average observed benefit in patients within a control 
group compared with the average observed benefit in patients given a particular drug.
• Data are collected and the observed value for the test statistic is calculated.
• The probability of getting the observed value (or a more extreme value) of the test 
statistic given that the null hypothesis is assumed to be true is calculated. This is 
known as the P-value.
• If the P-value is very small, then the null hypothesis is rejected. The definition of 
‘small’ depends on the stringency required: a standard threshold for declaring 
statistical significance (that a difference between the tested data and the expected 
value is a real difference and not just due to chance alone) is to find a P-value of 
less than 0.05 (1 in 20). 
 For example, new pharmaceuticals generally require at least two independent 
clinical trials with P-values less than 0.05 to be able to claim they are effective. 
 To claim the existence of the Higgs boson, physicists required a P-value of less 
than 1 in 3.5 million.
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The P-value is essentially a measure of the incompatibility between the observed data 
and a pre-specified hypothesis: if the P-value is very small, either the null hypothesis 
is true and a very surprising event has occurred or the null hypothesis is false. Many 
problems can arise in the use and interpretation of statistical significance testing. 
• The P-value is the probability of extreme evidence, given that the null hypothesis is 
true, but it is often interpreted as the probability that the null hypothesis is true, given 
the evidence. This is an example of the prosecutor’s fallacy.
• If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it does not mean it is true. This is similar to 
someone who is not found guilty in an English court: they are found ‘not guilty’ rather  
than ‘innocent’. 
• With a large dataset, a statistically significant result may not necessarily be of any 
practical significance, eg the difference in cure rates between a new and a standard 
drug might be only 1%.
• If an exploratory analysis of data without a pre-existing hypothesis suggests a 
hypothesis, an independent set of data should be used to test that hypothesis.  
This is known as a confirmatory analysis.
• It is poor scientific practice to conduct multiple tests and only report the most 
significant – this is very likely to be a false discovery and will give biased estimates.
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Appendix 5: Causation and relative risk
Statistical methods cannot establish proof of a causal relationship in an association.  
The causal significance of an association is a matter of judgement that goes beyond 
any statement of statistical probability. To judge or evaluate the causal significance of 
the association between the attribute or agent and the disease, or effect upon health, 
a number of criteria must be utilised, none of which is an all-sufficient basis for judgment.
Relative risk (RR) estimates are used with increasing frequency in toxic tort/delict 
litigation as evidence for a causal link between the putative toxic exposure and the 
personal injury sustained by the claimant. The simplistic phrase ‘doubling the risk’ is 
unhelpful, because there is rarely a single risk with no variation by age and sex, and 
rarely only one estimate, let alone a very precise estimate of a particular RR. 
An RR, or risk ratio, measures the size of the effect of a given risk factor on disease 
rates in specific populations. It describes the proportional increase in the probability of 
an event occurring in a group exposed to some condition, as measured from a baseline 
probability of an event occurring in a comparison group that has not been exposed 
to the condition. For example, men who smoke 15 – 24 cigarettes per day have an RR 
of lung cancer compared with never-smokers of about 26. The RR of lung cancer for 
regular drinkers of more than four glasses of wine per day compared with those who 
drink a glass of wine per week is about 3.2, averaged across smoking habits. After 
adjusting for smoking habits and other factors, the RR is 1.423. 
The RR of lung cancer with heavy drinking is more than halved by adjusting for smoking; 
this illustrates the importance of having a careful definition of a causal hypothesis 
and not drawing conclusions from a single estimate. Estimates from a range of 
epidemiological studies are needed. A medical statistician or epidemiologist will usually 
consider how study results relate to the viewpoints identified by Sir Austin Bradford Hill 
for the assessment of causality24. 
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The Bradford Hill criteria apply to general scientific conclusions for populations. But we 
may also be interested in individual cases, say in civil litigation where courts need to 
decide whether a particular exposure (say the asbestos encountered in a job) caused a 
negative outcome in a specific person (say John Smith’s lung cancer).  It can never be 
established with absolute certainty that the asbestos was the cause of the cancer, since 
it cannot be proved that the cancer would not have occurred without the exposure. 
But some courts have accepted that, on the ‘balance of probabilities’, a direct causal 
link has been established if the RR associated with the exposure is greater than two25. 
But why two? 
 
Presumably the reasoning behind this conclusion is as follows26:
• Suppose that, in the normal run of things, out of 1,000 men like John Smith, 10 would 
get lung cancer. If asbestos more than doubles the risk, then if these 1,000 men had 
been exposed to asbestos, perhaps 25 would develop lung cancer.
• Of those exposed to asbestos who go on to develop lung cancer, fewer than half 
would have got lung cancer if they had not been exposed to the asbestos.
• So more than half of the lung cancers in this group will have been caused by  
the asbestos. 
• Since John Smith is one of a group who was diagnosed with lung cancer, then on  
the balance of probabilities his lung cancer was caused by the asbestos.
These viewpoints are a common-sense approach to systematically evaluating a range 
of evidence. This section discusses the main concepts required to understand research 
findings. Discussion of the link between legal and scientific questions can be found in 
Dawid et al.27 and Hutton28.
Rates, ratios and risks 
• Rate or risk rate is the number of new cases identified out of the population  
under study. If 6 out of 100 babies are born with Down’s syndrome, the risk is 6%. 
The time scale is not specified. 
• An incidence rate is the number of new cases identified in a given time period 
divided by the total life time lived in that period by the population under study. If 6 
new cases of lung cancer are identified in a year, and 1,000 people were monitored 
during that year, the incidence rate is 6 per 1,000 person-years. 
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• RRs are used to compare incidence rates in two groups (hence rate ratio), usually an 
exposed group compared with a non-exposed group. Given a lung cancer incidence 
rate of 6 per 1,000 person-years in chimney sweeps, and 2 per 1,000 person-years in 
the general population, the RR for chimney sweeps is 6/2 = 3. 
• Excess risk is the difference between incidence rates in two groups. The excess risk 
of lung cancer for chimney sweeps is 6 - 2 = 4 per 1,000 person-years.
Epidemiology, basic principles and study types  
Epidemiological methods are used to investigate and estimate the frequency of medical 
conditions, the risk factors for those conditions, the effects of interventions and causes 
of ill-health and recovery.
Case reports or series 
Medical symptoms and conditions which appear to be unusual or novel are typically 
reported by describing a single case of a person with the conditions, or two or three 
cases. The role of these reports is both to alert colleagues to look out for similar cases 
and to encourage explanations and further investigation.
Retrospective case-control studies 
Case-control studies are efficient for investigating rare or newly emerging conditions 
or diseases, or those with a long gap between exposure and outcome, and allow 
multiple risk factors to be considered29. A study begins with finding a list of cases, 
such as people with throat cancer. Controls are selected to be people who are similar 
to the cases, for example in age, sex and socio-economic status, but without the 
disease. Exposure of both groups to factors such as radiation, as well as aspects of 
health such as weight and smoking, is assessed using medical or occupational records. 
Participants might be asked to recall exposure. Clear diagnostic criteria for the disease, 
and an equally thorough search for possible exposures among cases and controls, are 
important. By design, case-control studies investigate a single disease or condition. The 
main disadvantage of case-control studies is that they are open to several biases30. Bias 
can arise both through the quality of routine records and because the people with the 
disease are likely to take more effort to remember risk factors.
 
62 THE USE OF STATISTICS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS
Retrospective and prospective cohort studies
Cohort studies are observational studies which follow a group, or cohort, of subjects 
over time. The more explicit name ‘longitudinal cohort study’ stresses the time aspect. 
Cohort studies in health research aim to assess the possible factors in the development 
of disease or disability. The cohort must be explicitly defined, with inclusion criteria (eg 
employment in the civil service in 1967) and exclusion criteria (eg pre-existing cardiac 
disease). Basic characteristics of the cohort, such as age, sex, social status and current 
exposure to a range of factors are recorded.
A prospective cohort study actively enrols the defined cohort and collects baseline 
information. Subsequent health status is observed through follow-up. A retrospective 
cohort study, or historical cohort study, uses data from past records. In studies of health 
issues arising from occupational exposure, data from routine employment medical 
examinations and health and safety records can be used. A retrospective cohort study 
might provide information relatively quickly.
If the retrospective cohort continues to be followed after the first phase, the study 
includes both retrospective and prospective data. Cohort studies can provide 
information on a range of factors affecting a range of health states. It is easier to 
ensure consistency of measurement or recording of exposure factors and diagnosis in 
prospective cohorts than in retrospective cohorts or case-control studies. It is important 
that possible exposure or risk factors are clearly defined and that consistent effort is 
made to obtain data from the whole cohort. However, cohort studies are typically more 
expensive because they are larger. The results of a prospective cohort study can only 
be observed after some time, potentially a long time for slowly developing conditions.
Registry data and databases 
A disease or case register is a database which is intended to include all cases of a 
procedure, condition or disease in an identified population. Registers are used for 
clinical and service purposes as well as for epidemiological research. Successful 
registers need clear aims, appropriate data collection and validation systems, as well as 
regular analysis and feedback to interested parties. These requirements indicate that a 
multidisciplinary team, stable funding and relevant leadership are important. As disease 
registers contain medical information, both social attitudes to confidentiality and the 
jurisdiction will influence data collection and completeness31; Nordic registers have high 
coverage rates as consent is not required32. 
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Clinical databases, such as a list of children referred to a specialist hospital, are not 
regarded as a disease register, because a relevant population cannot be identified. 
Parents might travel across regions or countries to seek help33. If cases are collected 
from a service which focuses on provision for those with cognitive deficits, accurate 
clinical diagnoses and reliable information on people with normal or good cognitive 
ability will not be available34, 35. 
Randomised controlled trials 
Patients who have agreed to enter the trial are allocated at random to receive  
one of the trial treatments. The role of randomisation is to minimise bias arising from 
both patients or doctors who have strong beliefs about what the response to treatment 
ought to be. Randomisation also balances factors such as age, underlying health and 
compliance with treatment across the groups in combination with allocation concealment 
(blinding). With effective randomisation, the probability of differences between the  
trial groups in responses and adverse effects arising by chance can be calculated.  
A potential disadvantage of randomised controlled trials is that only a selected 
population is included.
Systematic review 
The Cochrane Collaboration36 defines a systematic review as a review of a clearly 
formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to identify, select 
and critically appraise all relevant research, and to collect and analyse data from the 
studies that are included in the review. Statistical methods (meta-analysis) may or may 
not be used to analyse and summarise the results of the included studies, depending 
on the quality and quantity of information. Some systematic reviews can only provide 
descriptions of the main features of the included studies. A summary of the evidence 
based on the data for each patient in each study is generally regarded as the optimal 
approach, but this is acknowledged often to be impractical owing to constraints of 
confidentially and time. Systematic reviews are contrasted with narrative or expert 
reviews, which are based only on research that is known by, easily available to or 
acceptable to the reviewers.
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Bias 
In epidemiology and statistics, bias typically refers to estimates which systematically 
misrepresent the quantity of interest. As a simple example, if a lecturer asks the 10 
students, out of a class of 100 students, who have come to all his lectures whether his 
lectures are worth attending, the answers given cannot be assumed to represent the 
view of the whole class.
Reporting standard 
In order to assess the quality of the research described in a published article, sufficient 
information is required. When medical statisticians began to assess the quality of 
medical research publications, one difficulty was the lack of information provided 
regarding the design and analysis of studies37, 38, 39. Since 2010, a series of statements 
and guidelines, with accompanying checklists, have been published to facilitate 
understanding of the study and assessment of the validity of results and conclusions. 
These can be found on the website of the Equator (Enhancing the Quality and 
Transparency of Health Research) Network40. 
Causality and the Bradford Hill criteria 
Suppose there is a qualifying association: a large and statistically significant association 
between a possible causal agent and a particular pathology. If this observed association 
cannot be easily explained by confounding and bias, further consideration of cause and 
effect is worthwhile. Confounding describes the situation when a risk factor other than 
the exposure in question is associated with both the exposure and the outcome.  
If the risk factor can be precisely measured, the effect of confounding can be estimated 
and the association between the exposure and outcome adjusted for the confounder. 
Higher alcohol consumption is associated with higher rates of lung cancer, but also with 
higher rates of smoking. In order to separate the effects of alcohol consumption and 
tobacco smoking on lung cancer, accurate records of alcohol and tobacco consumption 
are required. 
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Often a confounder cannot be precisely estimated and there may be various factors to 
consider as outlined in the Bradford Hill criteria illustrated in Regina v Abadom, 198341. 
Strength 
‘The strength of the association is expressed as a comparison between a standard or 
unexposed population and a population exposed to the putative causal agent. The RR 
of lung cancer for smokers is higher compared to never-smokers’42. ‘Strength’ is not well 
defined, although an RR of 5 would generally lead to further investigation. However, 
the baseline rate of the condition should also be taken into account. Headlines in 
2000 which reported a doubling of risk of deep vein thrombosis associated with oral 
contraceptives, without reporting the absolute risk of 2 per 10,000 users per year, 
resulted in many women abruptly stopping taking their pills. Doubling the risk increases 
the absolute rate to 4 per 10,000 users.
Consistency 
‘If an association is repeatedly observed by different people, in different places, 
circumstances and times, it is more reasonable to conclude that the association is not 
due to error, or imprecise definition, or a false positive statistical result’43. Further, the 
association should be observed in studies with a high methodological standard. 
Specificity 
‘Consideration should also be given to whether particular diseases only occur among 
workers within particular occupations. This is a supporting feature in some cases, but 
in other cases one agent might give rise to a range of reasons for death’44. The best 
example of a simple specific causal agent is thalidomide: the congenital deformity 
known as phocomelia is seen almost exclusively in the population of individuals 
exposed to thalidomide during gestation.
Temporality 
‘This requires causal factors to be present before the disease’45. 
Dose-response curve, or biological gradient 
‘If the frequency of a disease increases as consumption or exposure to a factor 
increases, this supports a causal association, for example, increasing levels of smoking 
associated with increased frequency of lung disease supports the hypothesis that 
smoking causes lung disease’46.
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Plausibility 
Biological plausibility that an effect is causal for an outcome to occur must be based 
on scientific reasoning or data, not just prior beliefs. Laboratory experiments might 
be possible, especially if the outcome effect can be modified by an appropriate 
experimental regime. However, extrapolation from animal experiments to humans is  
not straightforward. In the development of drugs, randomised experiments are required. 
For side effects with long-term treatments, or industrial exposures, other study designs 
are used.
Coherence 
‘A cause and effect interpretation should not seriously conflict with generally known 
facts of the development and biology of the disease’47.
Experiment 
‘Sometimes evidence from laboratory or field experiments might be available’48.
Analogy 
Bradford Hill commented: “In some circumstances it would be fair to judge by analogy. 
With the effects of thalidomide and rubella before us we would surely be ready to 
accept slighter but similar evidence with another drug or another viral disease in 
pregnancy.” This criterion has a limited role. If the criteria are not met, one cannot 
conclude that there is not a causal association. The conclusion is that there might be 
direct causal explanation, or an indirect explanation, or even that the association arose 
from some aspects of data collection or analysis. Competing explanations should be 
considered that might include unmeasured confounding factors or alternative factors 
which have an association of similar strength to the putative causal factor49.
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